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INTRODUCTION 
Racial integration is often cast as irrelevant to the contemporary project of 
ensuring racial equity in education. The day after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1,1 holding unconstitutional the 
voluntary racial integration programs in Seattle, Washington and Jefferson 
County, Kentucky, a prominent popular commentator urged the public not to 
“mourn Brown v. Board of Education”: Brown should be praised, Juan Williams 
argued, but ultimately “bur[ied].”2 Desegregation is irrelevant to addressing the 
high dropout rates of black and Latino high school students, or the racial and 
ethnic achievement gap, Williams contended, both because of the futility of 
achieving integration (given current patterns of residential segregation), and 
because racial malice could no longer explain the inferior quality of schooling for 
 
 †  Associate Professor, Columbia Law School. This paper builds on remarks that I made at 
Moving Education Forward, the Duke Forum for Law & Social Change conference on educational equity 
held on February 13, 2009. I am indebted to Aslihan Bulut of the Columbia Law Library, Diana Blank, 
Adia Gross, and Jessica Leinwand for their wonderful research assistance, and to Chinh Le for his 
thoughtful comments and suggestions. In addition, I am very grateful to the Clifford Chance 
Diversity Thought Leadership Program for funding part of the research for this paper. 
 1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 2. Juan Williams, Don’t Mourn Brown v. Board of Education, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/opinion/29williams.html. 
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minority children. Arguments for integration that depend on the diversity 
rationale—that integration prepares students to live and work in a pluralistic 
society—were “spent,” Williams argued.3 Rather, the focus should be on 
providing students the core skills necessary to participate in the global 
economy.4 
These comments raise familiar criticisms about racial integration: that it is 
neither achievable nor material to the current important questions in education.5 
Belief in the futility of the quest for integration certainly derives support from 
demographic realities. Current levels of school segregation remain high for both 
blacks and Latinos, and progress since the 1970s has been slowing.6 Academic 
commentators have long debated the extent to which racial integration remedies, 
such as mandatory school assignments and busing, have been 
counterproductive, hastening white flight and the ultimate resegregation of 
schools.7 And, even apart from the debates about the unintended effects of race-
based school assignment policies, most commentators agree that post-war 
demographic changes cemented by the 1970s and 1980s led to increased 
migration of white Americans from the cities to the suburbs,8 which made 
desegregation less possible in many communities, and thus less relevant to 
policy debates about improving education.9 Moreover, in a series of decisions in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Supreme Court articulated standards that 
made it easier for school districts to dismantle court-ordered desegregation 
plans.10 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Amy Stuart Wells et al., How Society Failed School Desegregation Policy: Looking Past the 
Schools to Understand Them, 28 REV. RES. EDU. 57, 57–58 (2004) (discussing increased emphasis on 
standards based reforms and a decreasing emphasis on poverty, inequality and segregation in 
debates on educational reform) [hereinafter How Society Failed School Desegregation]. 
 6. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 
RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 9–10 (2006) (documenting 
growing patterns of racial isolation for blacks and Latinos in the 1990s through the 2003–04 school 
year), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Racial_Transformation.pdf. 
 7. Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 
314–18 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996) [hereinafter DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION] 
(describing how arguments about white flight to the suburbs were used to defeat school 
desegregation policies); see Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos and 
Unequal Education, in id. at 61–62 (attributing decrease in white public school enrollment to trends in 
birth rates). 
 8. Much evidence shows that these post-war changes are not themselves race-neutral but were 
the result of federal and state housing policy as well as private discrimination and choices. See, e.g., 
DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 42–57 (1993) (detailing the role of private 
discrimination and state and federal policy in creating the ghetto in the post-World War Two era); 
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 190–230 
(1987) (describing how government policies and subsidies promoted residential segregation, 
suburbanization, and ghettoization). 
 9. The Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), rendered it difficult, if not 
practically impossible, to launch desegregation efforts across city-suburban district lines, thus taking 
meaningful racial integration off the map in a number of metropolitan areas. 
 10. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. 
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of the City of 
Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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Questioning integration’s connection to improving educational outcomes 
has a similarly long history. The common account, which was expressed by 
Justice Thomas in a series of desegregation decisions in the 1980s and 1990s and 
again in Parents Involved, is that desegregation has not produced good 
educational outcomes for minority students.11 The tepid academic gains of black 
students in the early years of school integration (measured by standardized tests 
in reading and math) seem to support this account.12 With this evidence of 
limited achievement gains, Justice Thomas could skeptically characterize 
integration as intended primarily to erase the psychological harm of segregation, 
a characterization that, of course, has roots in the psychological evidence that 
undergirds the Brown decision.13 As one moved further from legalized 
segregation, psychological harm seemed less salient and, in a reversal from 
Brown, a rationale that is even denigrating to black children, as Justice Thomas 
has suggested.14 
Even some integration proponents seem less swayed by the academic 
benefits than the “citizenship” benefits of Brown—that integration helps prepare 
 
 11. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121–22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Moreover, there simply is no 
conclusive evidence that desegregation either has sparked a permanent jump in the achievement 
scores of black children, or has remedied any psychological feelings of inferiority black 
schoolchildren might have had.”). 
 12. Initial post-Brown data showed only modest positive effects of desegregation on reading 
scores of minority students and no improvement in minority math scores. See, e.g., Laurence A. 
Bradley & Gifford W. Bradley, The Academic Achievement of Black Students in Desegregated Schools: A 
Critical Review, 47 REV. EDUC. RES. 399 (1977); NANCY HOYT ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: 
OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN (1975); Edgar G. Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on Aspirations, Self-
Concepts and Other Aspects of Personality, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 300 (1975); but see Crain & 
Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17 
(1978); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, The Effect of Research Methodology on Desegregation-
Achievement Studies: A Meta-Analysis, 88 AM. J. OF SOC. 839 (1983). Although the gap between black 
and white test scores has narrowed over the past two decades, some studies argue that this resulted 
more from gains in the socioeconomic status of black families than from desegregation. See David J. 
Armor, Why is Black Educational Achievement Rising?, 108 PUB. INT. 65, 77–79 (1992). 
 13. That social evidence about the harm of segregation centered on psychological effects has 
over the years since Brown been a particular subject of criticism by legal commentators who have 
argued that the social science evidence was weak, and that the resort to psychology was unnecessary 
because the social meaning of segregation was well-understood. See, e.g., Edmond Cahn, 
Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157–58 (1955) (“I would not have the constitutional rights of 
Negroes—or of other Americans—rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the scientific 
demonstrations in these records.”); Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 
YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (arguing that the purpose and impact of segregation in the southern regional 
culture were matters of common notoriety, “matters not so much for judicial notice as for the 
background knowledge of educated men who live in the world”). Several commentators have argued 
that the Court should have more explicitly focused on the role of segregation in perpetuating racial 
caste and hierarchy, see, e.g., id. at 429–30, or in denying blacks equal citizenship, see generally 
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989). 
 14. As Justice Thomas stated in Jenkins: “Given that desegregation has not produced the 
predicted leaps forward in black educational achievement, there is no reason to think that black 
students cannot learn as well when surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an 
integrated environment.” 515 U.S. at 121–22 (Thomas, J., concurring). For an account of broader 
criticisms of integration, see Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261, 265–68, 269–72 
(2006). 
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students to live in a pluralistic society and reduces prejudice.15 Some of these 
characterizations are no doubt strategic. With the Court’s acceptance of the 
diversity rationale for higher education affirmative action in Grutter v. Bollinger,16 
voluntary integration in primary and secondary education might have seemed to 
depend on a compelling interest akin to the diversity rationale. Yet, even apart 
from strategic considerations, integration’s central good often resounds in 
reducing prejudice and improving citizenship in a diverse society. James Ryan 
recently noted that the Court’s decision in Parents Involved would have little 
effect on educational policy “on the ground” because few school systems have 
integration plans and most have “moved on” to questions such as school 
funding, choice, and standards.17 The loss wreaked by Parents Involved, Professor 
Ryan noted, would be to the notion that schools have any role to play in 
preparing students for citizenship in a pluralistic society.18 
If racial school integration is to be buried, let it not be without a proper 
eulogy.19 Parents Involved, if not spelling racial integration’s doom, at least 
renders it more difficult to attain. Yet behind Parents Involved is an account that 
reveals that racial integration is neither entirely futile nor irrelevant to questions 
of educational equity. The arguments of futility given the current patterns of 
suburban–urban residential segregation are entirely reasonable. And yet, 
Jefferson County, Kentucky—one of the school districts at issue in the voluntary 
integration cases before the Supreme Court—is a strange place to make an 
argument about school integration’s futility, because Jefferson County has long 
been one of school integration’s relative successes. This success lies in the 
regional, metropolitan nature of the school desegregation and integration plan—
the kind of plan that has always augured the most success for school 
integration20 and which contains the potential to alter the deeply racialized living 
patterns that make school assignment policies necessary. Moreover, the story of 
Jefferson County shows how mandatory court orders, federal coercion, local 
politics, and sustained community mobilization operated to transform a school 
system from a de jure system of segregation to one of relative integration. 
 
 15. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 
132, 142–43 (2007) (stating that “[t]he defense of integration has always been on surer footing when 
one also considers its social benefits—the ways in which integration can break down or prevent 
stereotypes and prejudice, lead to long-term relationships across racial and ethnic boundaries, and 
increase the possibility that students will continue to seek out integrated colleges, workplaces, and 
neighborhoods”) [hereinafter Voluntary Integration]; Erica Frankenberg, Introduction: School 
Integration—The Time is Now, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: REALIZING THE PROMISE OF RACIAL 
DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 13–16 (Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007) (discussing 
extensive research focusing on academic benefits of desegregation which showed only modest gains 
in contrast to much more positive research documenting social and developmental benefits of 
integrated schools). 
 16. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 17. See Ryan, supra note 15, at 132. 
 18. Id. 
 19. With apologies to Justice Stevens. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language is to be interred, let it not be without a 
eulogy.”). 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 84–86. 
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In addition, the plaintiffs and their allies in Parents Involved argued that 
integration not only serves to diminish racial and ethnic prejudice, and to 
enhance citizenship, but promotes racial equity in schooling and beyond.21 As 
will be shown below, Parents Involved contained the empirical evidence that 
racial integration improves the short-term and long-term education prospects for 
minority students. The evidence in Parents Involved centered not on stigmatic or 
psychological harm, but on the claim that racially isolated schools are almost 
necessarily schools with high levels of concentrated poverty affecting 
educational achievement (through the production of poor quality schools) and 
ultimately social mobility.22 While at first glance this may appear to be an 
argument less about race than about class or poverty, the empirical claims 
depended on the complex interplay between race and class. Concentrated 
poverty is always primarily concentrated minority poverty, and the harms that 
flow to “racially isolated” schools depend not just on their poverty status but on 
their minority status.23 
To argue for integration’s benefits, plaintiffs and their allies depended not 
simply on increasing minority access to the financial resources of predominantly 
white communities—an argument that inevitably suggests equalization or 
upgrading of resources in minority schools as an alternative to integration (and 
may be less than compelling given well-known facts about how much many 
urban systems spend). Plaintiffs and their amici argued that integration not only 
provides minority students with access to middle-class schools, but with the less 
tangible networks of opportunity that attend those schools: peers with new skills, 
experiences, and expectations for their own achievement; middle-class parents 
with greater resources for school involvement; familiarity with integrated 
settings that can create greater comfort in integrated and predominantly white 
settings.24 This data is related to education’s democratizing function, but in a 
way that speaks to the core issue of equality: for this data also suggests that if 
integrated learning can break down racial stereotypes and bias, it may alter 
public policy by generating greater concern about racial inequality, and 
alleviating the plight of racial minorities.25 
Neither the empirical evidence nor the plaintiff’s account of Jefferson 
County’s integration journey was enough to secure five votes for sustaining the 
voluntary integration programs at issue in Parents Involved. Much of the case 
rested on the Justices’ respective views on the constitutionality of explicit racial 
classifications, and most of the Justices’ positions on that question were well-
known from prior affirmative action jurisprudence.26 But examining Parents 
 
 21. See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 120–36 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); see 
James E. Ryan, The Limited Utility of Social Science in School Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 
1689–90 (2003) (arguing that the social science in support of school integration was too equivocal to 
alter the Justices’ normative views on the constitutionality of race-conscious government action). In 
suggesting that the data was equivocal however, Ryan was mostly speaking about data on the short-
term effects of desegregation on minority achievement. See id. 
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Involved for what it reveals about integration’s relevance to contemporary 
questions of racial inequality is not offered simply to produce a eulogy. Rather, 
an examination of this evidence suggests the terms on which racial integration 
might retain its relevance: not merely to result in cosmetic changes in the levels 
of school segregation, but as a meaningful attempt to alter both the short-term 
and long-term structural arrangements that reproduce racial inequity. Parents 
Involved leaves some constitutional space for consideration of voluntary 
integration in schools, through race neutral and race conscious means.27 In 
addition, housing law and policy can also serve to promote residential 
segregation, with possibilities for integration in schools.28 The question is 
whether integration should remain on the policy agenda, and for what reason. 
This article examines Parents Involved for the light it sheds on integration’s 
continuing relevance to educational and social equity. Part I examines the story 
of school integration in Jefferson County and shows how this largely successful 
metropolitan integration plan challenges claims of racial integration’s futility. 
Part II puts forward the empirical evidence that plaintiffs in Parents Involved used 
in seeking to establish that school boards have a compelling interest in 
promoting racial integration and avoiding the harm of racially isolated schools. 
This part argues that the empirical case for racial integration, while not without 
limitations, moves beyond stigmatization, psychological harm, and the social 
meaning of segregation, and links integration to equity on the dimensions of 
school quality and social mobility. This part concludes by examining how 
empirical arguments might inform integration’s future, which I contend is 
possible primarily through close linkages between housing and school policy. 
The article concludes by acknowledging that many questions remain 
unanswered about integration’s future role in social policy, but that compelling 
arguments exist for not wholly abandoning the integration project. 
I. PAEAN FOR JEFFERSON COUNTY 
School integration’s failures are often overstated, but several commentators 
have noted its successes. Professor James Liebman has argued that, despite 
conventional wisdom to the contrary, desegregation lawsuits were successful in 
a large number of school districts.29 Similarly, Professors Jennifer Hochschild and 
Nathan Scovronick have noted that school integration was, “on balance, an 
 
 27. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007) (stating that school boards may pursue 
integration through “race conscious” measures such as “strategic site selection of new schools, 
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating 
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking 
enrollments, performance and other statistics by race”); cf. American Civil Rights Foundation v. 
Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 172 Cal.App.4th 207, 222 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2009) (holding that student 
assignment “which aims to achieve social diversity by using neighborhood demographics when 
assigning students to Schools” did not discriminate or grant preferential treatment on the basis of 
race). 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 160–67. 
 29. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School Desegregation Explained, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1467 (1990) (noting desegregation success stories in Buffalo, Columbus, Dayton, 
Denver, Minneapolis, St. Louis, San Diego, and Wilmington-New Castle, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 
Greenville, Jacksonville, Nashville-Davidson, and Tampa-St. Petersburg, as well as 
Louisville/Jefferson County). 
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educational success,” but that “mandatory desegregation was a political 
failure.”30 Jefferson County is one such location of relative success in terms of 
levels of stable integration achieved, but also, arguably, of political success as 
measured by eventual political acceptance of integration remedies. Significantly, 
Jefferson County provides a better lesson than Seattle School District, whose 
desegregation efforts were always limited in their scope.31 
Home to the City of Louisville and its surrounding suburbs, Jefferson 
County was for twenty-five years subject to court-ordered desegregation after its 
post-Brown integration efforts were deemed constitutionally inadequate by a 
federal court.32 As discussed below, the initial desegregation lawsuit and, in 
particular, the prospect of an adverse court ruling prompted the city’s school 
system to merge with that of the surrounding county. Subsequently, the district 
court ordered county-wide desegregation involving rezoning schools, 
introducing magnet schools, and reassigning students (including the use of 
busing). Initially, the plan was strongly opposed by many whites, as well as 
some portions of the African-American community, but over time, opposition 
died down and Jefferson County was soon touted as a model of school 
integration.33 
As will be discussed, Jefferson County’s experience is instructive on the 
conditions conducive to successful integration, including: the county-wide 
nature of the plan, which decreased the possibility of white flight; the active 
involvement by intermediary organizations—human rights commissions and 
parent groups in particular—who monitored the school district’s progress and 
compliance with court-orders, implemented their own reform strategies, and 
sustained a constituency for change; the significant work of governments and 
nonprofits to encourage housing integration, which had some effect on 
decreasing the need for student reassignment; and, eventually, the inclusion of 
“school choice” elements into the integration plan. Even after the mandatory 
desegregation order was lifted in 2001, Jefferson County continued its integration 
efforts, modifying the plan to minimize transportation of students, and to 
increase choice. 
A. History 
The Jefferson County school district, which encompasses the city of 
Louisville and its surrounding suburbs, has long struggled with the question of 
integration in its primary and secondary schools. Until the Brown decision, 
Kentucky mandated racially separate schools.34 After Brown, Kentucky officials 
 
 30. JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 29 (2003). 
 31. For a history of school integration efforts in Seattle, see generally Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2005); FRANK HANAWALT & ROBERT L. 
WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY OF DESEGREGATION IN SEATTLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1954–1981 (1981). 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 45–51. 
 33. See Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING 
DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 29; Liebman, supra note 29, at 1467. 
 34. See OMER CARMICHAEL & WELDON JAMES, THE LOUISVILLE STORY 39–42 (1957). 
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ordered the end of a dual school system.35 Kentucky’s approach contrasted with 
the massive resistance launched by many southern states.36 While segregation 
and racial subjugation thrived in Kentucky,37 by history and temperament the 
state was characterized by less overt racial hostility than many other southern 
states, and the City of Louisville in particular was known for its relative 
liberalism.38 After the Brown decision, the Louisville school system conducted a 
year-long community campaign to ready parents and civic and community 
leaders for desegregation, and set September 1956 as the date for beginning 
desegregation.39 In 1956, Louisville launched a plan to abolish the prior dual 
school system, which required redistricting of elementary and middle schools 
and the making of student assignments without regard to race.40 However, like 
many other southern school systems, the plan included a “free choice” element, 
liberally permitting transfers out of assigned schools.41 The plan met with initial 
criticism from the black community for its delayed start and “free choice” 
aspects,42 as well as some organized opposition by whites resistant to any form of 
racial integration.43 Yet in its first year, the Louisville plan could report some 
success: about half of all black students were attending integrated schools, and 
only eighteen percent of whites were in all white schools (with the strong caveat 
that an “integrated” school might contain as few as one student from another 
race).44 
This first desegregation effort ultimately failed to achieve stable integration, 
primarily due to the free choice and transfer policies, as well as demographic 
changes in housing patterns and white flight: by the early 1970s the schools were 
 
 35. Id. at 45–49. 
 36. See id. at 3–4, 45–47 (describing Kentucky and Louisville’s quiet acceptance of the court’s 
decision in Brown). 
 37. See, e.g., Scott Cummings & Michael Price, Race Relations and Public Policy in Louisville: 
Historical Development of an Urban Underclass, 27 J. BLACK STUD. 615, 615–17 (1997) (describing 
Kentucky and Louisville’s segregationist history and policies). 
 38. See, e.g., Benjamin Muse, Louisville, 4–5, 7 (June 17, 1964) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author) (noting, perhaps too rosily, that “Louisville has long been free from the type of 
demagogic appeal to race prejudice which has plagued many southern cities” and attributing this to 
Louisville’s “tolerance” and spirit of “liberalism”); CARMICHAEL & JAMES, supra note 34, at 14 
(discussing Louisville’s “climate of tolerance or live-and-let-live”); see also id. at 26 (“[I]n a decade of 
great changes in racial relations largely decreed by the courts, Louisville in some cases ‘read the 
handwriting on the wall’ and acted without legal compulsion, in one or two others proceeded 
without enthusiasm but also without disaster to comply with the law.”). To be sure, this 
characterization is only relative: Louisville resisted full equality for blacks in many areas and black 
gains in civil rights were the hard-fought result of litigation and protest. See, e.g., Cummings & Price, 
supra note 37, at 632–34. 
 39. See CARMICHAEL & JAMES, supra note 34, at 49–70 (describing efforts conducted with parent 
groups, civic leaders, the media, business and religious organizations); id. at 82, 84 (describing the 
target date). 
 40. See id. at 84–85. 
 41. See id. at 85–86. 
 42. See id. at 82, 86. 
 43. See id. at 90–91. 
 44. See id. at 118–20 (reporting statistics on integration in Louisville during the 1956–57 academic 
school year). 
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once again segregated.45 In 1971, the Kentucky Chapter of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and Louisville Legal Aid brought suit against Jefferson 
County in federal district court to require desegregation of the schools.46 In 1972, 
the ACLU and the Louisville Chapter of the NAACP brought a similar challenge 
in federal district court against the City of Louisville.47 As the cases were being 
litigated and a desegregation plan appeared imminent, the State Board of 
Education voted to merge the Louisville and Jefferson County school systems, 
effective April 1975.48 The impetus for merger was, at least in part, the city’s fear 
that mandatory desegregation of the city system alone would lead to the out-
migration of whites to county schools.49 
In July 1975, the district court ultimately issued a county-wide 
desegregation order for the school year, beginning on September 4.50 The 
desegregation plan required the Jefferson County Public School System (JCPS) to 
bus about 11,000 white children to predominantly black schools and 11,000 black 
children to predominantly white schools; ordered redrawing of attendance zones 
to create “clusters” to group predominantly white schools with predominantly 
black schools; and, mandated racial guidelines of no less than 14% but no more 
than 23% black enrollment in JCPS secondary schools and between 12% and 40% 
black enrollment in elementary schools (this was later changed to between 16% 
and 35% black enrollment for secondary schools and between 16% and 40% for 
elementary schools).51 
As in many cities, the Jefferson County desegregation plan met with 
virulent, and often violent, opposition, mostly from whites throughout the 
county, requiring for some time the deployment of one thousand national 
 
 45. See Marilyn O’Dell, Desegregation Policies In Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky—1956–
1985 31–32, 36–38 (May 1987) (unpublished dissertation on file with author); KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, LOUISVILLE SCHOOL SYSTEM RETREATS TO SEGREGATION (1972); KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOLS—EXCEPT LOUISVILLE—DESEGREGATE SCHOOLS (1972). By 1969, more than 
half the city’s schools were either 95 percent black or 95 percent white, and the City in 1971 came 
under investigation by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare for its segregated 
schools. See GEORGE K. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., JEFFERSON COUNTY EDUCATION CONSORTIUM, THE 
IMPACT OF COURT ORDERED DESEGREGATION ON STUDENT ENROLLMENT AND RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS 
IN THE JEFFERSON COUNTY KENTUCKY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, FINAL REPORT 19 (1978). 
 46. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Gordon, 521 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1975); Newburg Area 
Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974); Newburg Area 
Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973). 
 47. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 35–36 (describing suit by the KCLU and the NAACP). 
 48. See id. at 47–49 (detailing state merger decision); Martin M. Perley, The Louisville Story, 
INTEGRATED EDUC., Nov.–Dec., 1975, at 11. Prior to this order, the City had sought merger to address 
revenue shortfalls due to a shrinking tax base and population loss. See id. at 14; see also O’Dell, supra 
note 45, at 20–27 (describing revenue problems and merger proposals of the late 1960s). In addition, 
the district court judge in the City of Louisville case had ordered the merger of the school systems in 
a July 1974 order, which was reversed on appeal in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Milliken 
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), which held that interdistrict remedies could not be ordered without a 
specific showing of an interdistrict violation. 
 49. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 45, at 20–21; O’Dell, supra note 45, at 20–21. 
 50. See Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538, 540 (6th Cir. 1976) (affirming district court’s 
desegregation order). 
 51. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 50; KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SCHOOL AND HOUSING 
DESEGREGATION ARE WORKING TOGETHER IN LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY 1975–1983 4 (1983) 
[hereinafter SCHOOL AND HOUSING]. 
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guardsmen and four hundred state troopers to maintain order.52 The Louisville 
and Jefferson County political leadership had expressed their opposition to 
busing, and though they agreed to comply with the law, by some accounts they 
failed to take leadership to ensure peaceful desegregation.53 
While the opposition ultimately subsided, success of the desegregation plan 
in the early years was mixed. Some studies showed that the school desegregation 
plan led to white residential flight out of Jefferson County, and declining public 
school enrollment of white students as parents moved their children to private or 
parochial schools.54 Other studies noted increased housing desegregation as a 
result of the desegregation plan’s exemption from busing for residents who 
made pro-integrative moves, and the County’s use of the federal section 8 
Housing Assistance voucher program to place black families into suburban 
communities.55 The best read of the data suggests that there might have been an 
initial period of white flight, but the level of flight dissipated by the late 1970s.56 
By most measures, in 1980 JCPS was one of the most desegregated school 
systems in the country, and black students had made striking academic gains as 
measured by achievement scores in math and reading.57 In subsequent years, 
there were indicia of resegregation of parts of the school system, and indicia of 
failure to make sufficient gains in faculty and staff desegregation.58 
While the plan was not perfect, for the most part stable integration was 
achieved in many JCPS schools.59 And significantly, the integration program 
gained community support. In 1991, the Jefferson County School superintendent 
proposed dismantling elementary school desegregation.60 While some leaders 
and citizens, both black and white, supported an end to busing and mandatory 
school assignment policies, there was sufficiently strong opposition from 
community groups, parents, and the teachers’ union that the plan was 
 
 52. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 65–67 (describing how buses were pelted with rocks and bricks, 
some schools experienced bomb threats, and city made over two hundred arrests in the first few days 
of desegregation); CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 45, at 12, 13 (describing marches opposing 
desegregation plan which attracted as many as 2,500 people, and protestors meeting buses with 
“brickbats and bottles”); J.M. Wines, Busing: 5 Years Later, COURIER-JOURNAL, May 12, 1980, at 1, 4. 
 53. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 64–65, 90–91. 
 54. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 45, at 66, 98–99. It was less clear whether these moves 
were due to the desegregation plan. The birth rate also declined in the County. Id. at 98. The decline 
in public school enrollment coincided with the implementation of the desegregation plan and those 
who left disclaimed that anti-black animus had affected their decisions to move, instead claiming 
concerns about the quality of the schools. See id. at 79–83, 99–100. 
 55. See KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HOUSING DESEGREGATION INCREASES AS SCHOOLS 
DESEGREGATE IN JEFFERSON COUNTY 7–9 (1977). 
 56. See SCHOOL AND HOUSING, supra note 51, at 10. 
 57. See id. at 2–3, 6. 
 58. See id. at 28 (discussing the implementation problems in the 1982–83 year when twenty-five 
schools were outside the enrollment guidelines, and continued racial identification existed in teacher 
assignment patterns). 
 59. See Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING 
DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 291, 311–12, 325. 
 60. See Gary Orfield, Unexpected Costs and Uncertain Gains of Dismantling Desegregation, in 
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 73, 110–11 (suggesting portion of court-order was 
lifted in 1980). 
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abandoned.61 Instead the school district implemented a compromise, altering the 
desegregation plan to include a magnet school choice plan.62 
After the district court declared the school system unitary in 2000,63 JCPS 
adopted a student assignment plan to maintain and encourage integration, as 
well as maximize student choice, through a variety of mechanisms including 
magnet schools, magnet programs, and voluntary transfers.64 At that time, the 
school system was 34% black and about 66% white.65 Much like the mandatory 
desegregation plan, the 2001 plan required that no school have a black student 
enrollment of less than 15% or of more than 50%.66 Other aspects of the plan 
mirrored the mandatory desegregation plan. JCPS created geographic attendance 
zones, clustering schools in such a way as to achieve a student population within 
the racial guidelines.67 JCPS also furthered these racial guidelines by managing 
choice to magnet schools and to magnet programs, to which a student could 
apply regardless of where they lived.68 
Thus students were given choices within their cluster, as well as choices 
about magnet school programs.69 JCPS administrators and principals determined 
how to fulfill students’ choices based on student rankings of their preferences, 
available space, and the racial guidelines.70 JCPS also operated schools known as 
“traditional schools,” which offered the same curriculum as non-magnet schools, 
but also emphasized a structured educational environment, discipline and dress 
codes, and “concepts of courtesy, patriotism, morality and respect for others.”71 
JCPS determined admission to the traditional schools primarily by a student’s 
address and by a lottery system, but the racial guidelines operated here as well.72 
JCPS separated applications into four lists (black male, white male, black female 
and white female), and traditional school principals were allowed to draw 
candidates from the different lists to stay within the racial guidelines for the 
school.73 
 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000) 
(dissolving the desegregation decree). 
 64. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D. Ky. 2004). 
 65. See Post-Hearing Brief For Defendants at 4, McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., No. 
3:032-CV-620-H (W.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2004). 
 66. See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 842. 
 67. See id. At the elementary level and middle school level, most students attend what is 
effectively their neighborhood school (called a “resides school” under the plan). Id. at 842 n.10 (57% 
of elementary students attend their resides school and 67.5% of middle schools attend their resides 
schools). Slightly less than half of high school students (49.7%) attended their resides school. Id. 
 68. See id. at 843. JCPS operates thirteen magnet schools, eighteen magnet programs within 
specialized schools, and twenty-two “optional programs” which are small, specialized programs 
within regular schools. Id. 
 69. The choices are structured slightly differently at the elementary, middle, and high school 
levels. See id. at 844–45. 
 70. Id. at 845. 
 71. Id. at 845–46. There are nine traditional schools (four elementary, three middle, and two high 
schools) and two resides elementary schools that have traditional programs. Id. 
 72. See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 847. 
 73. See id. at 845–47. 
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In 2003, several families challenged the 2001 JCPS plan as violating, 
primarily, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. After holding a 
five-day hearing in December 2003, the District Court sustained most of the 2001 
plan, finding that JCPS had a compelling interest in voluntary integration.74 The 
court found most components of the managed-choice plan to be narrowly 
tailored to JCPS’s interest in furthering integration, but struck down the plan as 
applied to the traditional schools.75 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling, writing 
only a cursory opinion.76 JCPS abandoned its method of considering race for the 
traditional program.77 By the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006, 
only one plaintiff remained in the case.78 
As is well known, the Supreme Court ruled that JCPS’s assignment program 
(as well as that of the Seattle Unified School District) was unconstitutional.79 In 
particular, a majority held that the voluntary integration programs before the 
Court violated the Fourteenth Amendment. While four Justices (Chief Justice 
Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito) would forbid any voluntarily 
adopted student assignment plans that rely on race,80 Justice Kennedy found that 
integration was a compelling educational goal that a school district may 
pursue.81 Thus, there were five votes—including the four Justices in dissent—for 
allowing the use of race in student assignments, with Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
ultimately controlling on when such programs would be considered narrowly 
tailored.82 
B. Lessons 
In sum, JCPS’s 2001 integration plan was declared unconstitutional, and 
thus is no more. All indications are that JCPS will endeavor to pursue racial 
integration, but through other means.83 The point here is less to bemoan or 
critique the Supreme Court’s decision, but rather to highlight, as a counter to the 
cloak of despair that has surrounded the concept of school integration, what 
made JCPS a relative success. 
First was the regional, county-wide nature of the plan. As researchers have 
long noted, county-wide plans are generally more successful because they 
decrease the potential for white flight: there is literally less of an escape route 
 
 74. See id. at 837–38. 
 75. See id. at 855–56, 861–64. 
 76. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 77. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2749–51 (2007). 
 78. See id. at 2750 n.9. 
 79. See id. at 2760–61. 
 80. See id. at 2758 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
 81. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 82. Id. at 2792 (stating that school systems can pursue racial integration through a variety of 
means other than individual racial classifications such as “strategic site selection,” “drawing 
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods” and “recruiting 
students and faculty in a targeted fashion”). 
 83. See http://www.jcpsky.net/AboutUs/StudentAssigPlan.html (describing new student 
assignment plan); Emily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/magazine/20integration-t.html (detailing Jefferson County’s 
plan post- Parents Involved to consider class as well as race in student assignment). 
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through out-migration, and enrollment in private schools is not an option for 
many parents.84 There are certainly downsides to these plans, including the 
dispersal of black political control over schools into a regional governance 
system,85 but in terms of stabilizing integration, such plans have produced the 
best results. In addition, there is some indication that the program’s regional 
scope may have contributed to significant achievement gains by increasing not 
just racial integration, but socioeconomic integration.86 
In addition, community and civil rights groups, local governments, and the 
school board exploited the county-wide feature of the plan to promote policies 
that dismantled the city–suburb spatial divide between blacks and whites and 
thus began to alter housing patterns. As mentioned above, the desegregation 
remedy itself included individual incentives for housing integration—for 
example, exempting attendance zones in adequately integrated communities 
from busing. This had the effect of minimizing the need for busing which, along 
with the racial guidelines capping the percentage of black children in a school, 
might have diminished political resistance by whites to the plan. 87 The housing 
integration incentives also decreased housing segregation: data through the early 
1980s showed an increase in black residence in predominantly white 
neighborhoods.88 In addition, civil rights organizations and the Kentucky 
Commission on Human Rights intensified fair housing activity to complement 
school desegregation.89 A particularly notable innovation was a joint program 
between the Louisville and Jefferson County housing authorities to merge their 
federal section 8 housing program to provide city residents access to housing 
outside Louisville.90 
 
 84. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE BUS? 410–12 (1978); DIANA PEARCE, CTR. FOR NAT'L POL'Y 
REV., BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF METROPOLITAN SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION ON HOUSING PATTERNS 10–12 (1980), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ 
ERICWebPortal/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED199309; Christine H. Rossell, 
Desegregation Plans, Racial Isolation, White Flight, and Community Response, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 13–56, 47–49 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983). 
 85. See ORFIELD, supra note 84, at 413–16 (discussing conflicting black attitudes toward 
metropolitan desegregation). 
 86. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 93–97. 
 87. See SCHOOL AND HOUSING, supra note 51, at 26 (documenting a doubling of the black student 
population in predominantly white Northeast and Jeffersontown areas of the county between 1974 
and 1982); see also Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING 
DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 325 (stating that the school district was able to exempt 32 schools 
from busing by 1982 and number of students bused fell from 18,000 to 11,000 without affecting levels 
of desegregation). 
 88. See SCHOOL AND HOUSING, supra note 51, at 24–25. 
 89. See id. at 23 (discussing a 1975 fair housing campaign which used billboards, leaflets, and 
bumper stickers to inform Jefferson County citizens how housing desegregation can lead to 
neighborhood exemption from desegregation transportation); see also KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION SPURS FIRST HOUSING DESEGREGATION GAIN IN FORTY YEARS IN 
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY 19–21 (1980) (documenting housing desegregation between 1980 
and 1984) [hereinafter FIRST HOUSING DESEGREGATION GAIN]. 
 90. See SCHOOL AND HOUSING, supra note 51, at 24 (finding that one of every three black Section 8 
families were able to relocate from the city to the county); FIRST HOUSING DESEGREGATION GAIN, supra 
note 89, at 27 (attributing housing desegregation gains to section 8 program). 
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Second, Jefferson County is noteworthy because of the role civic 
organizations played in shaping the remedy and ensuring public support for the 
various integration plans. A standard critique of public law reform litigation is 
that it turns potential stakeholders into bystanders and leads to undue focus on 
courts as the site of social change.91 Jefferson County’s integration efforts, in 
contrast, appear to have been characterized by strong involvement of civic and 
community organizations, and at times by effective partnerships with 
government. Intermediary civil rights organizations were built into the remedy 
stemming from the 1975 school integration order. To help implement the order, 
the Louisville school system used federal grants from the Department of Health, 
Employment and Welfare (HEW).92 These grants helped to fund workshops for 
teachers; bus drivers and others employed in the school system; hotlines and 
other efforts to educate the community; and a task force composed of civic and 
religious organizations to promote peaceful desegregation.93 Through a small 
grant, the Louisville Human Relations Commission was able to hire a project 
director tasked with promoting desegregation.94 
Then, in the years following court-ordered desegregation, the Louisville and 
Jefferson County Human Relations Commission and the Kentucky Commission 
on Human Rights actively built community support for the desegregation plan, 
monitoring the county’s compliance with court orders, and evaluating the 
integration plans for success along a range of dimensions (levels of integration as 
well as student achievement levels).95 No doubt part of these organizations’ 
efforts can be traced to a handful of lively Louisville characters with strong 
commitments to school and housing integration. For instance, Galen Martin, who 
served as the executive director of the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights 
from 1963 to 1989, and also served as head of the Fair Housing Council, was 
renowned for his decades-long effort to promote school and housing integration 
in Jefferson County.96 
But Kentucky also possessed the organizational structures to enable this 
individual and civic energy. Most notably, Kentucky had several well-
established, publicly-funded organizations dedicated to civil rights enforcement 
and advocacy. The Kentucky General Assembly had established the Kentucky 
Human Rights Commission in 1960, several years before the federal Civil Rights 
 
 91. See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE 
LAW PRACTICE 3 (1992); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 2027, 2043 n.73 (2008) (collecting sources articulating the “long-standing critique of ‘cause 
lawyering’ . . . that it places too much faith in lawsuits and diverts energy from the political strategies 
that are necessary to secure long-term social change”); see also id. at 2043, 2062–65 (discussing 
contemporary public interest lawyers’ awareness of and responses to the limits of litigation). 
 92. See Perley, supra note 48, at 12. The HEW grants and Emergency School Aid grants totaled 
$1,880,000. Id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 13. 
 95. See, e.g., FIRST HOUSING DESEGREGATION GAIN, supra note 89; KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, VESTIGES OF SEGREGATION REMAIN IN JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOLS (1977) (detailing the 
shortcomings of desegregation attempts in Jefferson County). 
 96. See Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights, A Statement from the Human Rights Commission Upon the 
Death of Galen Martin, Dec. 20, 2006, http://migration.kentucky.gov/Newsroom/kchr/ 
Galen+Martin+Death.htm. 
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Act of 1964, to address discrimination, civil relations, and issues of inequity.97 
Kentucky became the first southern state to pass its Civil Rights Act in 1966 
forbidding discrimination in public accommodations, education, housing, and 
other areas, and the Act granted the Kentucky Human Rights Commission 
primary enforcement authority.98 Similarly, Louisville established the Louisville 
Human Relations Commission in 1962.99 This Commission was formed to help 
combat discrimination in education, employment, and housing in particular, and 
was charged explicitly “to develop harmonious inter-group and interracial 
relations” and “to enlist the support of civic, religious, labor, industrial and 
commercial groups, and civic leaders dedicated to the improvement of inter-
group and interracial relations and the elimination of discriminatory 
practices.”100 The Louisville Commission later played a role in building civic and 
parental support for the desegregation plan, as well as in monitoring the results. 
None of these agencies came into being without effort. They were the product of 
hard-fought battles led by Kentucky citizens promoting civil rights. Yet 
Kentucky’s human rights infrastructure, among the first in a southern state, 
likely helped to support the judicial mandates for desegregation. 
A final and related factor that appeared to play a role in the relative success 
of Jefferson County’s school integration efforts was the interaction of mandatory 
and voluntary features in shaping of the program. Court-mandated 
desegregation presents a conundrum. On the one hand, because political officials 
can essentially shift blame for pursuing integration to courts, court-mandated 
desegregation has in many cases proven more successful in terms of achieving 
integration than those voluntarily adopted by political entities.101 Courts can set 
deadlines and exact penalties for non-enforcement, which are often necessary to 
force political actors to behave. On the other hand, court mandates can create 
additional community resentment because of the judiciary’s perceived lack of 
democratic accountability.102 In some sense, the existence of active intermediary 
organizations in Jefferson County might have permitted some of the democratic 
participation gained in voluntary programs, while court mandates provided an 
incentive for political action. 
The integration program had voluntary elements in another sense. As 
mentioned above, as both black and white members of the Jefferson County 
community began to resist busing, political officials increased the use of magnet 
 
 97. See Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights, Who We Are, http://kchr.ky.gov/about/aboutkchr.htm 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (discussing history of the Kentucky Human Relations Commission). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Muse, supra note 38, at 7–8, 21–23. The Louisville Human Relations Commission was 
established on March 27, 1962 by the Louisville Board of Aldermen, and with the backing of the 
Mayor, after significant pressure from black citizens. See id. at 17–18. 
 100. Id. at 27; see also id. at 25, 30, 36–38 (describing early efforts to address employment equities, 
housing discrimination and to prevent white flight from Louisville). 
 101. See Rossell, supra note 84, at 33; O’Dell, supra note 45, at 94–96. 
 102. See HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 30, at 33–34. Some studies also show greater 
achievement gains in school systems that employ voluntary integration as compared to those in 
which integration was mandated. See, e.g., Walter G. Stephan, Blacks and “Brown”: The Effects of School 
Desegregation on Black Students, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT 131, 131–33, 153 
(Thomas Cook et al. eds., 1984); Lawrence A. Bradley & Gifford W. Bradley, The Academic Achievement 
of Black Students in Desegregated Schools: A Critical Review, 47 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 399, 417, 433 (1977). 
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schools and magnet programs that seek to encourage integration without 
mandated student assignment.103 After the system was declared unitary in 2001, 
the choice elements of the plan increased. While the program continued to 
mandate levels of integration, parents were given a choice of schools within a 
cluster, as well as choices about educational programs in magnet schools and 
programs (outside of the usual policy of assignment to neighborhood schools), 
and in the majority of cases those choices were honored.104 Studies conducted in 
Jefferson County shortly after institution of the 2001 plan showed overwhelming 
support for the choice elements of the integration plan, and strong support 
(seventy-seven percent of all respondents) for maintenance of the racial 
guidelines to ensure racial integration.105 It may be that the choice elements of the 
integration plan helped maintained political support by increasing overall 
contentedness with the school system. 
More broadly, choice programs suggest an answer to political resistance to 
integration remedies. In something of a puzzle, studies consistently show high 
public support for integration, but low support for integration remedies such as 
busing.106 The simple answer may be that professed support for integration is 
either insincere or shallow. But it also may be that remedies that incorporate 
choice may be more politically palatable than those that rely on mandatory 
assignment.107 The record of the JCPS case certainly contains some evidence to 
support that view. The political success of the Jefferson County program 
appeared as a rationale when the voluntary integration program was challenged 
in district court.108 JCPS’s support for the program included expert testimony 
that the 2001 plan in its use of choice and of racial guidelines made the schools 
more attractive and generated community support for the school system.109 JCPS 
did not make much of this argument in its briefs to the district court, but the 
district court’s opinion, making use of the surveys and the testimony, expounded 
on this rationale. According to the district court, the evidence supported JCPS’s 
view that students were less likely to flee the public school system to private 
schools because parents perceived the schools to be roughly equal.110 In effect, 
the court concluded that the integration program helped to create a system 
 
 103. See Gary Orfield, Unexpected Costs and Uncertain Gains of Dismantling Desegregation, in 
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 110–11. 
 104. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 843–45 (JCPS operated 
thirteen magnet schools, eighteen magnet programs within specialized schools, and twenty-two 
“optional programs” which are small, specialized programs within regular schools. See id. at 843. 
 105. The survey by the University of Kentucky showed that 97% of parents supported school 
choice, 82% believed that students benefit from attending racially integrated schools, and 77% 
(including 89% of blacks) believed that schools should have guidelines to ensure racial diversity. See 
Post-Hearing Brief of Defendants, supra note 65, at 6 (citing defense exhibits 37, 38). 
 106. See, e.g., Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 34 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008); Percy Bates, Desegregation: Can We Get There 
From Here?, PHI. DELTA KAPPAN, Sept., 1990, at 8. 
 107. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 
2043, 2057 (2002) (discussing opposition to mandatory interdistrict school assignment policies). 
 108. See Post-Hearing Brief of Defendants, supra note 65, at 6. 
 109. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 107. 
 110. See McFarland , 330 F. Supp. at 834. 
Johnson_cxns.doc (Do Not Delete) 6/22/2009 3:48:31 PM 
 INTEGRATION, RECONSTRUCTED 35 
where all residents felt invested in the public school system. According to the 
court: 
The [JCPS School Board] also believes that school integration benefits the system 
as a whole by creating a system of roughly equal components, not one urban 
system and another suburban system, not one rich and another poor, not one 
Black and another White. It creates a perception, as well as the potential reality, 
of one community of roughly equal schools.111 
These statements suggest not just the political acceptance of the plan’s 
choice elements, but a broader transformation from an era of racial segregation to 
one in which all schools are deemed worthy of equal respect and concern.112 It is 
difficult to empirically substantiate whether this transformation in the political 
economy of schools happened in Jefferson County, but to the extent that it did, it 
points to integration’s potentially deep connection to structural equity, which I 
discuss in the next part. 
C. Possibilities 
Simply put, JCPS’s integration story shows that the quest for integration 
need not be futile. None of this is to say, however, that JCPS’s integration plan 
achieved perfection. One indication is that Jefferson County, despite decades-
long efforts, maintains patterns of housing segregation familiar to most 
metropolitan areas, with blacks concentrated in the city and whites in the 
surrounding suburbs.113 Louisville has features of many large urban cities, 
including a declining population and a shrinking tax base.114 A perfectly 
successful school integration plan would likely affect housing integration over 
the short-term by disincentivizing people from choosing segregated 
neighborhoods, and over the long-term by diminishing the bias and stigma that 
might contribute to housing segregation. That this has not fully happened in 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. This is similar to Charles Lawrence’s argument that Brown “is not only about access to 
resources; it is about the creation of community itself.” Charles Lawrence, Forbidden Conversations: On 
Race, Privacy and Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 
YALE L.J. 1353, 1378 (2005). According to Lawrence: 
[T]he affirmative act of integration, the movement from dual to unitary, is required for the 
transformation from an established ideology and structure that excludes and demeans 
black and brown children to one that values and cares for them as members of the larger 
community. As the community's chosen instrument for the creation and nurture of mutual 
relationships and the transmission of values, culture, and knowledge, ‘public’ education 
creates community and defines its bounds. The transformation of society envisioned by 
Brown cannot be achieved when the location of societal transformation is not held in public 
trust. 
 Id. Similarly, James Liebman has described the wrongs of school segregation as rooted in “legislative 
racism.” See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1541, 1617–18 (describing “legislative racism” as race-based 
“political judgments about how organized society should allocate scarce resources, educational and 
otherwise”). 
 113. See Cummings & Price, supra note 37, at 620–22. 
 114. See id. Between 1960 and 1990, Louisville’s population declined by thiry-one percent while 
the population in Jefferson County grew by eighty percent. Id. at 622. A majority of the black 
population of Jefferson County lives in Louisville; and in 1990, blacks constituted only nine percent of 
the population in Jefferson County outside of Louisville. See id. 
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Louisville and Jefferson County is one indicator of the qualified nature of what 
we call “success.” 
Yet, the substantial successes of Jefferson County’s integration efforts are 
worth noting for more than retrospection. To the extent that Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion leaves room for schools to pursue integration, it matters that school 
systems and advocates for integration are able to argue that integration efforts 
are not inherently counterproductive or doomed. The implications are probably 
greatest for domains outside schools, such as housing, where policy discussions 
about the desirability of racial integration in housing continue. 
II. INTEGRATION AS EQUITY 
At a basic level, it seems strange to examine racial integration’s connection 
to equity as if it presents a novel argument. After all, Brown was fundamentally 
about ensuring equal educational opportunity for black students.115 Yet today, 
some argue that Brown and the racial integration rationale encapsulated a 
particular ideal about racial equity and inequity that is outmoded.116 The Brown 
view of the harm caused by segregation, one might argue, depends on social 
meanings associated with state-sanctioned segregation. Once the state sanction is 
removed, the negative meaning becomes less salient. Thus, in contemporary 
popular discourse, the quest for racial integration seems not only irrelevant to 
quality learning for black children, but also, possibly denigrating to blacks: “Why 
do black children have to sit next to white children to learn?” 
As others have noted, this conception disregards Brown’s fundamental 
notion of equal citizenship: that, at least in this country’s historical context, 
separation had meant a subjugation that is fundamentally at odds with equal 
citizenship.117 But Brown’s reliance on empirical evidence about the psychological 
harm of segregation rather invited this caricature. Then, in the years following 
Brown, the empirical evidence on integration showed only modest academic 
gains for black students.118 
Against this backdrop, the empirical evidence presented by integration 
advocates in Parents Involved reframed the arguments for integration’s benefits 
and segregation’s harms, connecting racial segregation’s harms explicitly to the 
school deficits it produces, and connecting racial integration’s benefits not only 
to short-term academic gains, but to long-term social capital gains for minorities. 
This empirical evidence permits us to understand with greater specificity, albeit 
still imperfectly, the mechanisms by which segregation signals and produces 
harm in schooling today, as well as the role integration can play in producing 
 
 115. See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1485–88 (discussing equal educational opportunity rationales 
for Brown but arguing that these rationales are rejected in later court desegregation decisions). 
 116. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2. 
 117. See C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal 
Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1030–48 (1980); Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation 
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 (1960); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court—1975 Term, Foreword: In Defense 
of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7, 34–36, 42 (1976); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme 
Court—1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5–6 
(1977). 
 118. See infra text accompanying notes 137–38. 
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academic and longer term societal gains for minority students. As acknowledged 
above, these empirical arguments were not sufficient to allow the Court to 
sustain the programs at issue in Parents Involved. But they might still matter in 
the significant space that the opinion leaves for exploration of racial integration 
in schools and in housing. 
A. The Ecology of Inequality 
In Parents Involved, plaintiffs and their amici articulated the familiar interests 
in reducing prejudice and improving students’ preparation to live and work in a 
racially and ethnically diverse society. Yet the plaintiffs also sought to focus on 
the precise harms of racially segregated schools to minority achievement.119 As 
Goodwin Liu has recently noted, there are “difficult methodological challenges” 
to documenting the relationship between racial segregation and educational 
inequity.120 The harm to educational attainment that plaintiffs emphasized in the 
Parents Involved litigation, and that gained emphasis by advocates in the years 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, centers on the connection between racially 
segregated schools and poverty concentration.121 This empirical claim received 
the most attention in the lower court arguments in the challenge to the Seattle 
voluntary integration plan. In that case, the district also urged an interest, which 
was not emphasized in the Jefferson County litigation, in avoiding the harms of 
racially concentrated schools.122 Finding a compelling interest in avoiding racial 
isolation, the court credited research showing that high-minority schools are 
more likely to have high rates of poverty than are predominantly white schools, 
and that along with those “high-rates of poverty come lower average test scores, 
lower levels of student achievement with less-qualified teachers and fewer 
advanced courses.”123 While some high-minority, high-poverty schools do not 
have these characteristics, the court found that such schools were exceptions.124 
 
 119. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND ET AL., LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K-12 SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION 12–14, 15–17 (2005), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/ 
voluntary/Voluntary_K-12_School_Integration_Manual.pdf. See infra text accompanying notes 125–
27. 
 120. See Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL L. REV. 277, 292–93 (2007) (discussing studies 
that separate “the effect of school racial composition from the influence of students’ social 
background and other school and nonschool determinants of learning” and which find strong 
negative relationships between achievement in particular areas and the percentage of black 
enrollment). 
 121. See infra text accompanying notes 125–27. 
 122. The district presented evidence that because of racially segregated housing patterns in 
Seattle, the use of a neighborhood school assignment policy would result in segregated schools. See 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 
S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. (citing ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., A 
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 11 (2003), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf). 
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The harms of concentrated poverty were presented in both the plaintiffs’ 
briefs and the briefs of amici to the Supreme Court in Parents Involved.125 In short, 
the plaintiffs presented evidence that these schools have fewer educational 
resources: in particular, less rich curricula, larger class sizes, poorer facilities, 
poorer quality teachers and—because of their low-income student population—
more educational needs.126 Much of this evidence derives from research that is of 
recent vintage, reflecting recent efforts by educational researchers to understand 
the ways in which race and class interact to maintain inequality in schools.127 
At first glance, to understand the harm of segregation in terms of 
“concentrated poverty” might seem to be less about race than about income or 
class. Yet such a conclusion would oversimplify the peculiar operation of race in 
our society, as well as the inseparable confluence of race and poverty. For one 
thing, some of the problems associated with low-income schools are exacerbated 
in high-minority schools. Teacher quality is perhaps the most powerful example. 
Numerous studies have found that teachers play a significant role in promoting 
student achievement.128 Yet high-minority schools tend to have a greater 
proportion of inexperienced teachers than predominantly white schools.129 They 
also possess teachers who are less-qualified, and experience high teacher 
turnover.130 Studies have shown that race—rather than working conditions, 
student poverty, or teacher salary—seems to account for teacher mobility.131 
Second, not only are some of the observed deleterious effects of racial 
isolation associated with the race variable, and not simply with poverty, but the 
entire condition of poverty concentration exists primarily for blacks and Puerto 
 
 125. See, e.g., Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 
2927079, *10–12. 
 126. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND 
EDUCATIONAL INEQUITY (2005), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/ 
deseg/deseg05.php. 
 127. See, e.g., SUSAN EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON TRIAL 343 
(2006) (noting that much of the evidence on the effects of concentrated poverty and segregation as 
well as the benefits of integration began to be generated in the 1990s). 
 128. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. SANDERS & JUNE C. RIVERS, CUMULATIVE AND RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF 
TEACHERS ON FUTURE STUDENT ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT 6–7 (1996), available at http:// 
www.mccsc.edu/~curriculum/cumulative%20and%20residual%20effects%20of%20teachers.pdf; S. 
Paul Wright, Sandra P. Horn & William L. Sanders, Teacher and Classroom Context Effects on Student 
Achievement: Implications for Teacher Evaluation, 11 J. PERSONNEL EVAL. IN EDUC. 57, 63–66 (1997). 
 129. See PATRICK M. SHIELDS ET AL., CTR. FOR THE FUTURE OF TEACHING AND LEARNING, THE 
STATUS OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION 24 (2005); SUSANNA LOEB & MICHELLE REININGER, EDUC. POLICY 
CTR., PUBLIC POLICY AND TEACHER LABOR MARKETS: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHY IT MATTERS i–iii 
(2004); Linda Darling-Hammond, The Color Line in American Education: Race, Resources, and Student 
Achievement, 1 DU BOIS REV. 213, 218–19 (2004); Catherine Freeman, Benjamin Scafidi, & David 
Sjoquist, Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools, 1994–2001: Trends, Causes and Impact on Teacher 
Quality, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 148 (John C. Boger & Gary Orfield 
eds., 2005). 
 130. See JENNIFER B. PRESLEY, BRADFORD R. WHITE, & YUQIN GONG, EXAMINING THE DISTRIBUTION 
AND IMPACT OF TEACHER QUALITY IN ILLINOIS 17–18 (2005); Susanna Loeb, Linda Darling-Hammond, 
& John Luczak, How Teaching Conditions Predict Teacher Turnover in California Schools, 80 PEABODY J. OF 
EDUC. 3, 44, (2005); Benjamin Scafidi et al., Race, Poverty and Teacher Mobility, 26 ECON. EDUC. REV. 145, 
149, 157–58 (2007); see also Liu, supra note 120, at 295–98. 
 131. See Scafidi et al., supra note 130, at 157–58. 
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Ricans.132 This poverty concentration is not simply the result of higher rates of 
poverty among these groups, but is also the result of racial discrimination in 
private housing markets, and federal, state, and local housing policy that has the 
effect of creating racially segregated, low-income ghettos.133 For the most part, 
poor white Americans do not live in neighborhoods of high poverty 
concentration.134 While poor whites might experience all the significant 
constraints associated with poverty, they are more likely to live in 
neighborhoods that provide them access to middle-class schools and other 
resources.135 In addition, the poverty levels of schools correlate strongly with 
race. Because of the effects of residential segregation and other factors, black 
middle-class students tend to live in communities and attend schools with higher 
concentrations of poverty than their white counterparts.136 
B. Long Term Benefits as Social Capital 
Early desegregation research showed only a modest positive impact on 
African-American achievement as measured by test scores. These early studies 
found modest positive gains in reading for black students, but no effect on math 
scores.137 There may be convincing explanations for these tepid results. Many of 
these studies were conducted in the very early years of desegregation and failed 
to account for the school conditions and context surrounding desegregation, 
including community resistance to desegregation, hostility by white teachers, the 
existence of within-school tracking, the age at which black students had been 
integrated, and whether the desegregation plans were voluntary or court-
ordered.138 
Given this research, as a matter of strategy integration advocates might 
simply shift emphasis to benefits better supported by the empirical evidence: 
that school integration produces beneficial long-term effects for both black and 
white students in terms of racial attitudes and ability to interact with those of 
 
 132. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 8, at 118–25, 144; see also id. at 114 (describing studies 
showing higher levels of housing discrimination faced by dark-skinned Hispanics as compared to 
those with lighter-skin). 
 133. See infra text accompanying note 5. 
 134. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 8, at 118, 124–25, 130. 
 135. See id. at 125, 130. 
 136. See Erica Frankenberg, Introduction: School Integration—The Time is Now, in LESSONS IN 
INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 9. 
 137. See, e.g., David J. Armor, The Evidence on Desegregation and Black Achievement, in SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 129, at 43, 58; Norman Miller & Michael 
Carlson, School Desegregation as a Social Reform: A Meta-Analysis of its Effects on Black Academic 
Achievement, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 102, at 89, 96, 104. 
 138. See Wells et al., How Society Failed School Desegregation, supra note 5, at 66–67. Several later 
studies on academic achievement during desegregation were able to identify some of the conditions 
that helped produce achievement gains. For instance, greater achievement gains occurred when 
blacks were integrated into schools with better teachers, stronger curricula, and higher expectations 
for students. See id. at 68; Gary Orfield, Foreword, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 2 
(describing segregated classes, discriminatory teacher assignment, discriminatory counseling, and 
other conditions limiting the social and academic experiences of students in the early years of 
desegregation); Crain & Mahard, supra note 12, at 17, 18, 34. 
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other races.139 The Supreme Court’s emphasis on diversity in the higher 
education affirmative action context might also have encouraged researchers to 
focus on the benefits of integrated environments to white students, and towards 
the reduction of racial stereotypes.140 In many ways, Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
in Grutter articulated a much more robust view of the diversity rationale, one 
connected to fundamental structural arrangements in our democracy.141 
Yet to rely on the affirmative action jurisprudence’s articulation of diversity 
benefits—usually conceived as improvements to interracial understanding, 
classroom discussion, and critical thinking skills—would forgo establishing an 
empirical basis for what many of us know anecdotally: that minorities who 
experience great socioeconomic mobility or who gain access to elite universities 
and other elite settings are more likely to have gone to integrated schools. It also 
invites a concept of integration as unconcerned about black achievement—much 
as Justice Thomas expressed in his opinion in Parents Involved when he 
concluded integration was not about black achievement gains—but rather with 
elitist arguments for cultural diversity.142 
The research on long-term effects of school desegregation on graduates also 
bears a non-speculative relation to educational achievement for minorities. In 
particular, data suggests that minorities who attend integrated schools are not 
simply gaining changes in attitudes or the ability to get along with others of 
different races, they also gain great life successes. For example, researchers Amy 
Stuart Wells and Robert Crain have reviewed a number of studies finding that, 
controlling for variables such as test scores, and socioeconomic status, African-
American graduates of desegregated high schools earned higher degrees—and 
eventually gained more social mobility and income—than graduates of 
segregated high schools.143 
 
 139. Cf. Janet W. Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations, A Review of the Literature, 
17 REV. RES. EDUC. 335, 339 (1991) (encouraging shift away from research focused on academic 
achievement to research on the effect of desegregation on intergroup relations). 
 140. See Frankenberg, supra note 15, at 15 (describing evidence supporting diversity in higher 
education which was marshaled for the Grutter and Gratz cases); ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 13 (2006) (describing research on educational benefits 
of diversity spawned by Justice Powell’s articulation of the diversity interest in Bakke). 
 141. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–32 (2003). The majority opinion in Grutter, by 
Justice O’Connor, contends that racial diversity improves classroom interactions, but also that it 
ensures the democratic legitimacy of our institutions. Id. As Justice O’Connor puts the point: “In 
order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the 
path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. 
All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the 
educational institutions that provide this training.” Id. at 332. For a discussion of Justice O’Connor’s 
expansion of Bakke’s notion of “diversity,” see Lani Gunier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: 
Guardians at the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 175 (2003) (contending that 
Justice O’Connor’s “opinion for the Court affirmed that the conversation about racial diversity 
extends beyond the classroom to include the fundamental role of public education in a democracy”). 
 142. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2776–77 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (2007); see also Ryan, supra note 15, at 131 (noting these arguments). 
 143. See Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School 
Desegregation, 64 REV. RES. EDUC. 531, 552 (1994); see also Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M. 
McPartland, How Minorities Continue to Be Excluded From Equal Employment Opportunities, 43 J. SOC. 
ISS. 5, 9–12 (1987). 
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The mechanics that produce these effects are less than clear. As several 
researchers have noted, the findings on long-term effects indicate little about 
“how and why these outcomes occurred in desegregated high schools.”144 Jomills 
Braddock has described school integration as a counter to “perpetuation theory,” 
a term Braddock coined in 1980 to explain that blacks who have been raised in 
segregated settings will tend to avoid integrated settings because they anticipate 
hostility.145 Braddock, Wells, and Crain have also suggested that integrated 
schools might lead to peer and adult networks that provide information about 
educational and employment opportunities, and that are necessary to promote 
socioeconomic mobility in our society.146 Closely related mechanisms that might 
explain how integration improves long-term outcomes are employers’ greater 
comfort with applicants who have attended majority white schools, and the 
reputation of majority white schools among employers and higher education 
institutions.147 While more needs to be known about how integrated schools and 
integrated peer networks operate in this context, what Wells and Crain have 
described is an enhancement of social capital—a term I use broadly to mean the 
resources and networks necessary for educational and social development.148 The 
emphasis here is not simply on improvement of interracial cooperation, but on 
the improvement of life chances and social mobility through the networks 
developed in integrated settings. 
It may be that data about social capital benefits will have limited ability to 
link racial integration to contemporary questions of racial equity. Much like the 
citizenship benefits from interracial contact, these social capital benefits require 
one to look beyond educational achievement as measured by test scores, to the 
role of schools in disrupting segregation patterns and in producing longer-term 
social equity and inclusion for blacks. As the asserted mission of schools narrows 
to test score achievement, social capital arguments may do no better job of 
resuscitating public support for integration, just as the citizenship benefits 
achieved through interracial contact are not seen as related to the purposes of 
 
 144. Wells et al., How Society Failed School Desegregation, supra note 5, at 69. 
 145. See Jomills Henry Braddock II, The Perpetuation of Segregation Across Levels of Education: A 
Behavorial Assessment of the Contact-Hypothesis, 53 SOC. EDUC. 178, 179, 181 (1980). 
 146. See Wells & Crain, supra note 143, at 552. 
 147. See, e.g., id.; see also Wells et al., How Society Failed School Desegregation, supra note 5, at 69. 
 148. See Glenn Loury, Essays in the Theory of the Distribution of Income 20 (May 17, 1976) 
(unpublished dissertation on file with author) (encouraging the consideration of “social capital”—
“the consequences of social position in facilitating individual acquisition of (say) the standard human 
capital characteristics”—in understanding income differences between whites and African-
Americans); Glenn Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions, 12 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 117, 199–20 (1998) (discussing effects of social networks in limiting employment 
opportunities for blacks). I acknowledge some risk in abusing the term “social capital,” which has a 
variety of overlapping meanings in the political science and sociological literature. See, e.g., Robert 
Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America, 28 POL. SCI. & 
POLS. 664, 664–65 (1995) (describing social capital as “features of social life—networks, norms and 
trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives”); ROBERT 
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 19–23 (2001) (describing development of the term social capital); Alejandro 
Portes, Social Capital And Its Origins In Modern Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 2 (1994) (stating that the 
term “social capital” is “being put to severe tests by . . . increasingly diverse application” and that the 
term simply embodies a “staple notion” in sociology that “involvement and participation in groups 
can have positive consequences for the individual and the community”). 
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education.149 Further strengthening of social capital arguments would require a 
better understanding of the relation between traditional short-term measures of 
achievement and the long-term social capital achievement measures. This 
understanding might shed light on the past and the future of school integration 
in Jefferson County itself. Integration, as discussed earlier, was relatively 
successful in Jefferson County as measured by levels of school integration, initial 
achievement score gains, and the long-term effects on graduates,150 but a 
significant racial achievement gap, though narrowed, still remains.151 
Looking at the social capital benefits for minorities who attend integrated 
schools also might allow us to revisit and reframe the citizenship benefits gained 
by interracial contact as capable of addressing racial inequality. If, as in 
Braddock’s account, African-Americans attending integrated schools gain a 
comfort that permits them to function more broadly in integrated settings, then 
whites also gain benefits in the reduction of their prejudice and greater comfort 
and contact with blacks and other minorities.152 One might hope, then, that 
“perpetuation” operates for whites as well, with ramifications for racial equity. 
Greater comfort in integrated settings might increase movement towards racial 
integration in schools, housing, and employment, as well as increasing 
willingness to support policies that aid minorities and which might alter 
structural racial arrangements. 
C. Integration Imperatives 
Given that the equity-related arguments for racial integration did not 
persuade the Court, the question going forward is the continuing relevance of 
the equity framework to broader, contemporary policy discussions on racial 
integration. In my view, the equity-based arguments in Parents Involved could 
remain powerful if shifted to correspond to the current policy—as opposed to 
litigation—environment. 
In the Parents Involved litigation, empirical evidence on integration’s 
relationship to educational and social equity was introduced to make the case 
that integration was a compelling interest.153 The framing of this empirical 
 
 149. See Ryan, supra note 15, at 144 (arguing that benefits of intergroup cooperation and prejudice 
reduction “are no longer included in most conversations about the mission of public schools”). 
 150. See Amy S. Wells et al., Refusing to Leave Desegregation Behind: From Graduates of Racially 
Diverse Schools to the Supreme Court, 110 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 12 (2008) (qualitative study of 
seventeen graduates of integrated high schools in Jefferson County reporting greater comfort in 
integrated settings than their peers, which they believe enhanced their ability to participate in a 
global economy); see also Brief of Profs. Amy Stuart Wells et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 
05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2927074, * 17 (citing this study among other studies showing benefits of 
integration). 
 151. See COUNCIL OF GREAT CITY SCHOOLS, BEATING THE ODDS VIII, CITY-BY-CITY PROFILES, 
http://www.cgcs.org/BTO7/Jefferson.pdf (citing U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, COMMON CORE OF DATA PUBLIC ELEMENTARY/SECONDARY SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 
(2006)) (showing an increase in the reading and math proficiency of black fourth graders between 
2001 and 2006 but that a black-white achievement gap of more than 20 points remains). 
 152. See, e.g., Frankenberg, supra note 15, at 16–17. 
 153. Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2821–22 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (discussing social science supporting integration as a compelling governmental interest). 
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evidence to ward off an equal protection challenge—and to satisfy narrow 
tailoring—need not constrain future policy discussions on exploring integration’s 
current relevance and efficacy. 
To argue that racial integration must be connected to questions of structural 
equity is not to suggest that racial integration is a requirement for educational 
gains for minority students. It may be, as some integration advocates urge 
outside the strictures of equal protection litigation, that integration is the only 
route to substantial educational gains for disadvantaged minorities: that other 
school reforms will be unsuccessful without racial integration.154 Yet to adopt 
this view, integration advocates must grapple more directly with what Jim Ryan 
notes is education policy’s move away from racial integration to questions of 
“school funding, public school choice, charter schools, vouchers, standards and 
testing, and universal access to preschool,”155 as well as the fact that some of 
these other policy interventions are bearing fruit for minority children.156 
Strategies to achieve racial integration may be complimentary with many of 
these other interventions, such as improvements in teacher quality and access to 
preschools, but it stands in greater tension with some charter school reforms 
directed at poor students in particular. 
Some charter schools appear not only to consider integration irrelevant to 
their model, they also advance educational approaches that assume that different 
educational interventions (such as increased school time) might be required to 
produce educational improvements for low-income minority students as 
opposed to middle-class students. I do not pretend to resolve these debates on 
educational imperatives, which appear to be in dispute even among educational 
policy experts. Rather, I contend that one might justify integration on educational 
and socioeconomic equity grounds, and still leave room for other interventions 
targeted at underachieving minority children. 
In the policy (as opposed to litigation) context, racial integration must 
address arguments that socioeconomic integration provides an alternative to race 
based assignment.157 In the equal protection argument of the school districts, 
socioeconomic integration was cast as an inadequate alternative because it would 
 
 154. See Orfield, Forward, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 6. 
 155. See Ryan, supra note 15, at 142–43. 
 156. See, e.g., Janet Currie, Early Childhood Intervention Programs: What Do We Know?, 15 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 212 (2001); Jens Ludwig & Douglas L. Miller, Does Head Start Improve Children’s Life Chances? 
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design, 122 QUAR. J. ECON. 159 (2007). The overall success of 
charter school interventions as compared to public schools is mixed. See NAT’L CTR FOR EDUC. STAT., 
A CLOSER LOOK AT CHARTER SCHOOLS USING HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING vi (2006) (analyzing 
2004 and 2006 data and finding that traditional public schools outperform charter schools on reading 
and math standardized tests). Some charter schools, most famously the Knowledge is Power Program 
Schools (KIPP) have shown significant success in improving test scores of urban, mostly black 
students. See Steven M. Ross et al., Achievement and Climate Outcomes for the Knowledge is Power 
Program in an Inner-City Middle School, 12 J. OF EDUC. FOR STUD. PLACED AT RISK, 137, 137 (2007). While 
charter school admission is lottery-based, rigorous programs may select out less motivated or 
prepared students and their families. See Erik W. Robelen, KIPP Success Cited, With Caveats, EDUC. 
WEEK., Nov. 12, 2008. 
 157. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, CENTURY FOUNDATION, RESCUING BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 3 (2007) (discussing socioeconomic integration as a response to the Parents Involved 
decision). 
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not produce racial integration.158 But in the larger policy debates this argument is 
less adequate. If higher levels of poverty are a chief harm of racially segregated 
schools, then this is one that socioeconomic integration would appear to directly 
address. With socioeconomic integration as an option, racial integration appears 
necessary only to promote intergroup cooperation benefits, benefits that have 
political limitations. 
One response might be the increased production of research (such as the 
teacher quality data referenced earlier) to show how race functions apart from 
income to maintain inequality. One might also encourage increased attention, as 
discussed earlier, to the mechanisms that produce long-term benefits and social 
capital gains for graduates of racially integrated schools. But even these efforts 
are unlikely to account for the complex ways in which race operates, and thus 
suggest the limits of any empirical argument for racial integration. The complex 
functioning of racial inequality—which serves to limit social mobility and to 
stigmatize159—is not easy to quantify. Also, the benefits of racial integration, in 
transforming opportunities for previously disadvantaged minorities, and the 
political economy of concern for the problems of minorities might similarly elude 
empirical analysis. 
Finally, if racial integration appears to be waning in terms of school district 
support for race-based student assignment policies, more emphasis should be 
put on the problem of residential segregation and the socioeconomic 
fragmentation of metropolitan areas.160 Indeed, Parents Involved, by decreasing 
the range of constitutional school integration policies, would seem to shift 
attention to the problem of residential segregation. School reform advocates 
might be less focused on school integration today, but rich debates and 
commentary continue in the housing field where claims of residential 
segregation’s harms often center on its deleterious effects on school quality and 
minority educational achievement.161 
Addressing residential segregation, however, should not be mistaken for 
the simpler course of action. The factors contributing to residential segregation 
are many, including past and present government policy, discrimination in 
private markets, and exclusionary zoning, and though there is no dearth of 
policy proposals to address the problem, insufficient progress has been made on 
 
 158. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 
S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2944684, at * 47–48 (discussing inadequacy of race-
neutral alternatives such as socioeconomic integration). 
 159. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE BRIDGE OVER THE RACIAL DIVIDE 98 (2001) (discussing the 
“social structure of inequality”); GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 92–93, 160, 
166 (2002) (discussing stigma as a way to understand persistent inequality); see R.A. Lenhardt, 
Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2004) (arguing 
that racial stigma rather than intentional discrimination should be seen as the main source of racial 
harm). 
 160. For recent discussions of both, see generally SEGREGATION, THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 
(James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008); THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY (Xavier De Souza 
Briggs ed., 2005). 
 161. See, e.g., Xavier De Souza Briggs, More Pluribus, Less Unum?: The Changing Geography of Race 
and Opportunity, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 160, at 29–34. 
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increasing housing integration.162 Moreover, residential segregation cannot 
simply be described as the cause of school segregation. Rather, the relationship 
between school and housing segregation is one of mutual dependence. Families 
with resources choose neighborhoods based on the racial and ethnic composition 
of the schools, the percentage of poor students, as well as the actual and 
perceived quality of those schools.163 Real estate agents market neighborhoods on 
the basis of schools, and often accomplish racial steering by directing prospective 
homeowners based on the racial and ethnic composition of the neighborhood’s 
schools.164 For these reasons and more, the demographic group most resistant to 
racial integration in housing consists of families with school-age children.165 At 
the same time, racial integration and improving school quality can promote 
racial and socioeconomic integration. Much data shows that the stability of 
integration in neighborhoods depends in part on the stability and extent of the 
integration in schools,166 and incompletely desegregated school systems can 
exacerbate residential segregation.167 This mutually dependent relationship 
between school and housing segregation suggests the need for increased 
attention to the ways in which housing and school policies interact to reinforce 
segregation as well as to decrease quality school and housing opportunities for 
too many poor minorities. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, it may be easier to argue that integration matters for equity than 
to figure out how to achieve it—given what the Supreme Court’s school 
desegregation law has bequeathed us, and given current patterns of residential 
segregation. After all, while Jefferson County shows that integration is not 
necessarily futile, many of the most promising reforms have occurred in 
metropolitan school districts. If the integration conversation is to remain alive, it 
 
 162. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA: KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S 
ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS 165 (2006) (despairing that the federal government is unlikely 
to meaningfully address residential segregation). 
 163. See Erica Frankenberg, The Impact of School Segregation on Residential Housing Patterns, in 
SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 164 (2005) [hereinafter Residential Housing 
Patterns]; Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the Social 
Construction of School Quality, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 177 (2002) (study finding that high-status (white 
and wealthy) parents tend to move to white school districts or closer to predominantly white schools 
because of the information gained from social networks about the quality schools). 
 164. See PEARCE, supra note 84, at 10–12. 
 165. See Ingrid Gould Ellen, How Integrated Did We Become During the 1990s?, in FRAGILE RIGHTS 
WITHIN CITIES 137 (John Goering ed., 2008). 
 166. See, e.g., PEARCE, supra note 84, at 4 (1980) (finding that metropolitan school desegregation 
“not only unhooks school racial composition from neighborhood composition . . . [i]t also neutralizes 
and may even reverse the incentives in the housing market”); INST. ON RACE AND POVERTY, MINORITY 
SUBURBANIZATION, STABLE INTEGRATION, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN FIFTEEN METROPOLITAN 
REGIONS (2006), available at http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/Minority 
_Suburbanization_full_report_032406.pdf (study of fifteen metropolitan areas finding more stable 
residential integration in regions that employed large-scale busing for school integration from 1980 to 
2000). 
 167. See Frankenberg, Residential Housing Patterns, supra note 163, at 165, 181 (finding that where a 
large proportion of racially identifiable schools remain in a school system it can contribute to greater 
levels of residential segregation). 
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is likely to reside in efforts that address residential segregation and that link 
housing to schools: in promoting school reform policies that encourage racial 
integration, and in establishing housing policies that stabilize integration in both 
housing and schools. This article’s contribution is less to answer all the questions 
about how this task should be accomplished—although we have many good 
models to point the way, including linking mixed income housing development 
to school reform efforts, and ensuring that the siting of subsidized housing 
promotes school integration168—but to urge that racial integration remains in the 
national conversation about how to address contemporary racial inequity. 
 
 
 168. See generally JOHN A. POWELL ET AL., COMMUNITIES OF OPPORTUNITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR A 
MORE EQUITABLE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR ALL (2007), available at 
http://kirwaninstitute.org/publicationspresentations/publications/index.php (detailing the 
“Communities of Opportunity” framework, which proposes to fix disparities through fair housing 
and community development); Deborah L. McKoy & Jeffrey M. Vincent, Housing and Education: The 
Inextricable Link, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 125, 134–44 (James H. Carr ed., 
2008) (discussing federal, state, and local policy interventions to link school and housing reform); 
Frankenberg, Residential Housing Patterns, supra note 163, at 178 (noting efforts in Charlotte 
Mecklenburg county to link housing and school policy, including by ensuring that public housing is 
located in areas that help promote integration in schools). 
